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Fomenko’s Case: Europe should reconsider its policy on fake news distributors


The European Union must fight harder against the spread of fake news, which has become widespread in the digital age. Still, there are essentially no effective mechanisms in place for such a battle, said Viola von Cramon-Taubadel, a member of the European Parliament from Germany and Vice-Chairman of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee, in a comment to journalists.

 

“The main instrument in the fight against misinformation is a highly educated society that can reveal and recognize fake news, what type of information it conveys, and how to fact-check it,” Cramon-Taubadel stated.

 

The MEP further revealed that it is still very difficult to defend legally against fakes and smear campaigns, especially when it comes to slander.

 

“The law is tied to the physical world, not the virtual one. Our prosecutors cannot keep track of all the cases which may be relevant and which could be brought before a criminal court – and that is a problem. Therefore, we need a better justice system, more prosecutors specializing in the digital environment, and an effective way to address such issues. We have to come up with a systematic approach to working with large digital companies and all social media,” said Cramon-Taubadel.

 

The European Union remains helpless in the face of smear campaigns using fake information. Meanwhile, the people behind such campaigns are becoming more creative and audacious – particularly those involved in spreading Russian propaganda.

 

“Concerning the systematic misinformation that often comes from Russia and its propaganda institutions, its main goal is destabilization. They cleverly designed these deceptive campaigns in various countries to make them appear not alike. In Ukraine, the used narratives entirely differ from those that appear in Germany, which, in turn, are completely unlike the ones in the Czech Republic, and so on. That is, in the EU, there are different forms of deceptive campaigns that are usually run by the Russian Federation,” explained Viola von Cramon-Taubadel.

 

Fake news distributors feel confident enough to target the main institutions of free Europe – the European Commission and the European Parliament. A striking example is a hoax created by Dmytro Fomenko, a businessman from Dnipro (Ukraine). He announced a roundtable to take place in the European Parliament on June 16, 2020. The event was supposed to be organized by the European People’s Party, and among the participants were well-known European parliamentarians – Viola von Cramon-Taubadel among them. Soon, it became clear that neither the European People’s Party nor the deputies knew anything about this roundtable. Ultimately, the event did not happen at all. As journalists later found out, it was a complete fake.

 

“In general, such events – with the co-organization of deputies – can come about. Having said that, it is quite appalling to steal and illegally use the logo of a party or political group and create a fake event,” stated Viola von Cramon-Taubadel.

 

Even before the roundtable supposedly took place, the MEP denied her participation in it, calling the event “fake news.” Fomenko later accused Cramon-Taubadel of working for the Kremlin and receiving bribes for denying her participation in the event.

 

“This person is not even worth mentioning. As I have said, Ukraine suffers from many significant problems: it is on the verge of an economic crisis; the country cannot properly deal with the pandemic as well. We have to talk about serious topics concerning Ukraine, which are plenty; not about this case of Fomenko, which I’m not going to discuss any further,” said Cramon-Taubadel.

 

Meanwhile, Fomenko’s case has proved once again that the EU needs to review its policy on organizers and distributors of fake news. In the digital age, information is capable of instant dissemination. And in some cases, it can lead to serious political, social or economic destabilization.

 

“I know that many member states are working on a more structured legislation. We are working on a digital database to combat hate speech, fake news and so on. But as far as I know, it is not over yet, and we will discuss it after the summer recess,” the MEP summed up.

 

 



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The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy Beyond COVID-19 – E-International Relations


As Europe went from being the epicenter of the coronavirus pandemic to a situation where most European countries are confident that they are past the worst of the crisis, the focus of the European leaders is now towards the resurgence of the society back to normalcy. Beyond the epidemiological challenge of the virus – the economic, political, geopolitical as well as security challenges faced by the Union are also plenty. Though the European Union’s Global Strategy of 2016 (PDF) highlighted the detection, prevention and response to global pandemics as a priority, the massive consequences and implications on the security policy of the EU are unprecedented. In a continent that is always undergoing shifts, the outbreak of COVID-19 is likely to cause an impact much similar to that of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States of America in 2001.

The most direct and immediate impact is economic in nature which is taking place concurrently to the pandemic. Most European companies including the EU defence firms are witnessing a historic drop in their stock market prices. This is subsequently leading to a rise in their debt ratios and eventually causing a functional threat to their survival. Further, as the public authorities are channelling their resources towards fighting an unprecedented challenge, the funding towards the defence sector and its initiatives is bound to be diminished.

As Europe enters a massive economic recession, defence spending will also take a blow in terms of priority. Europe’s recovery from the outbreak will require unparalleled levels of financial stimulus and thus, the allotted funding to previous defence initiatives, which do not seem to play a key role in the overall recovery of Europe, is likely to decrease. Spending on the defence sector, which had finally reached its pre-2008 financial crisis level in 2019, is now likely to see a reverse trend. The lack of funds will also have a directly proportional relationship with the in-house Research and Development sector of the European defence firms. As long as the COVID-19 crisis persists, its impact will continue to be seen as the slowdown of innovation in the European defence sector, further diminishing the European competitiveness in the same.

As the spending on defence sector slumps, the development of several initiatives on the EU defence cooperation such as European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Peace Facility (EPF) will lose their velocity. The number of Member States already questioning the political credibility and the value of financing these initiatives will rise, fragmenting the otherwise flourishing integration project of the supranational Union. With COVID-19 wreaking havoc on the already unequal economies of the Northern and Southern European states, unity and solidarity are already under stress as Member States embolden nationalist narratives, rather than European solutions. Political will is a crucial factor for a transnational actor like the EU in order to develop an effective framework for European security and to establish itself as a credible security partner alongside NATO. The EU defence project will only make sense if the Member States support each other in principle in times of crisis.

The EU’s position as a security actor is under question as a result of the pandemic. Owing to the high cost of dealing with the socio-economic damage caused by the outbreak, the EU’s operational readiness of crisis-management activities will be narrowed down. The Union’s willingness to contribute troops to civilian and military activities on Libyan, Syrian and Ukrainian territories is likely to decrease. This inward-looking perspective of the European security policy further creates a risk that crisis in such regions may worsen at the peak of a pandemic. This will not only add to the human suffering in the neighborhood, but also create a nexus of vulnerability and crisis for Europe. If not handled effectively, non-state actors may begin to take advantage of this period of vulnerability of the Union. Negative externalities could spill over to the EU, such as accelerating the migrant issue and leading to political polarization within the Member States.

While COVID-19 continues to transform political and economic realities in Europe, it becomes imperative for the EU to advocate a holistic recovery package that focusses not only on the reconstruction of economies but also on the diversified security needs of the alliance. The EU has to cope with the pandemic as well as the economic recession without sacrificing the European defence sector initiatives and competitiveness, which could play a functional role in not only maintaining security and stability but also in pushing towards an EU-wide plan of economic and industrial re-launch. At the same time, it is important to note that the need for advancing solidarity on the defence policy front has never been as compelling. With the EU facing the heat on both sides of the pacific in the face of US-China rivalry and transatlantic relations also under stress, the exigency for a more coherent, geopolitical, self-reliant Europe is emergent.

The European Union External Action Taskforce’s factsheet on ‘COVID-19: Lessons and Implications for EU Security and Defence’ (May 2020) highlights the need of the Union to confront all possible security consequences of the pandemic, in order to be truly prepared and resilient for the future. The document brings out the five key essential initial lessons learned in order to overcome the crisis: partnerships, solidarity, responsiveness, capabilities and preparedness. It is advisable for the EU to not abandon its pre-coronavirus agenda on security and defence policy, which is required to be truly responsive to imminent threats facing the continent. Thus, the EU must incorporate European defence cooperation to be a part of its post-pandemic recovery, in order to achieve the goal of strategic autonomy, and enhance its role a security actor in the international realm.

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A New Concept for Policy Studies in International Relations


We face a series of existential problems in 21st century international politics (environmental degradation, global migration, and the weaponization of nuclear material, to name just three), whose successful tackling demands radical imagination and suggests thinking beyond the box. Indeed, we are demanded to think beyond, and in radical alternatives to, those understandings of politics and policy strategies, which seem to have caused these problems in the first place. The famous Einstein-quote suits here well, saying that: “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” Interdisciplinarity is hereby a keyword of our times, also requested as irreducible condition by many important funding agencies, promising to lead to new concepts, insights, and empirical solutions through the synergetic effects of research approaches and methods.

In this vein, I suggest to merge the two disciplines of political philosophy and policy studies with the aim to develop an understanding of politics and respective novel policy guidelines, which help to enhance radical imagination and alternatives. Such merging results in the concept of reversibility, which is well-established in the natural sciences and in economics, but is a novel concept for the study of politics. Reversibility recommends the malleability or pliability of political action and policies with the awareness, however, of never being able to overcome contingencies, ambivalences, and inadvertent consequences of our political action. Reversibility also functions as an a priori reflection and ethical constraint for political action and policy-making, which demands humility facing ever-existing uncertainties and inadvertent consequences of politics. But only in the reversibility of policies as an institutional mechanism, preventing the implementation of irreversible politics, and as an ethical virtue of humility towards the unpredictabilities and indeterminacies of policy-making, as two main features of the political process proposed by policy studies, lies responsible political action. It is responsible precisely as, and only if, it accounts for the contingencies and uncertainties of our world, hence only abides by the criteria of responsibility if reversible.

With the notions of indeterminacy, uncertainty, and contingency of the political and human world, political philosophy comes into play. With, for example Hannah Arendt – who has carefully observed that modern politics has been traditionally, and one must say still is, obsessed with stability, thus excluding contingency and acting upon the human world which is assumed as static, given, and open to our wonts – we must realise that our political systems and our natural environment is indeed fragile and finite. Thus, we thus must act politically with care and the awareness of permanent uncertainties and contingencies. In fact, policy-making and policy-implementation has to account for the latter as the conceptual triangulation of Critical Theory, Classical Realism, and neo-Aristotelian prudence, suggest.

The concept of reversibility leads to the development of a clear further research agenda in close cooperation with policy-makers, be they state, intergovernmental, or NGO actors. Such a research agenda includes questions such as: How does a concept of reversibility translate into policy design and policy implementation? What are institutional mechanisms, which prevent consequences that harm contingency and take effect when, and as soon as, such consequences occur? Are such institutional mechanism accompanied, supported and facilitated by an ethical habitus of reversibility?

I suggest for illustration one example of reversibility in practice. This example is the law case “State of Hawai’i and Ismail Elshikh vs. Donald J. Trump” that declared Trump’s executive order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” from January 27, 2017 as unconstitutional (see Case 1:17, CV 00050-DKW-KSC from March 15, 2017) and based its dismissal on the argument of the avoidance of ‘irreparable’ and ‘irrevocable’ consequences for large parts of the American and of migrant populations. This judgement and its justification seems guided by a self-aware and ethical reflection on humanity linked with the unforeseeable nature of policy consequences on people and humanity itself (see the self-reflections on the judgement 28/43; 32/43; 38/43). Thereby, the decision addresses both identifiable, already manifested consequences and rectifies those with possibly irrevocable consequences in the future. Both, already manifested and possible future consequences are specified, for instance, with regard to irrevocable impacts for the University of Hawaii and for Higher Education in general (see on “intangible impacts” [17/43]), with regard to “irrevocable damage on personal and professional lives” [18/43; 28/43; 40/43] as well as with regard to future uncertainties for international travel [20/43]), tourism, and family union.

The concept of reversibility thus seeks to encourage and further the synergy of scholarly expertise, concretely between political philosophy in IR and policy studies, in cooperation with policy-makers for the management of international and global problems, rethinking the ways we conceive of politics and the human world and how to tackle, if not solve current challenges.





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